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7 Supervising the Intemational 
Financia! System 
JOSEPH P. DANIELS 
Introduction 
As the Group of Eigbt (G8) evolves, the elite club has shown that it is willing 
to tackle issues that are domestic in nature yet have an intemational linkage. 
That is, domestic issues that share a commonality across member nations or 
have considerable extemalities become part of the agenda. Issues of aging 
populations and employment levels are examples. On the other hand, the G8 
has a]so shown a preference to delegate to international bodies intemational 
issues that may affect member nations to varying degrees. 
In many cases, the delegation of responsibility is wise. In the case of 
infectious diseases, developing an agenda and delegating responsibilities to 
the World Health Organization (WHO) is a sound managerial decision. 
Delegating agendas and responsibilities to intemational organizations that are 
ill-equipped or unable to deal with pressing issues, however, is at best inef-
fective and perhaps even reckless. 
Recent responses of the G8 to contemporary economic problems, 
which are rooted in the financia} sector as opposed to the real sector, have been 
to ignore, minimize, and delegate to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 1 
The outcome is ineffective and reckless policymaking. In the middle of the 
financia) meltdowns in Asían and Russia, and with contagian lapping at the 
shores of Latin America, a single day's editorials in the Wall Street Joumal 
argued the following: 
... Argentina is about the only nation where the (lntemational Monetary) 
Fund's gotten it right since the current crises began with the Mexican 
bailout back in 1994 ... The issue is not sirnply the large amount ofmoney, 
but also an IMF record that in any responsible fmancia] institution would 
require the frring of senior management...2 
In the same article George Soros made the following remark about 
the response of the G7 nations to the crisis: 
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The third major factor working for the disintegration of the global capi-
talist system is the evident inability of the intemational monetary author-
ities to hold it together. IMF programs do not seems to be working. The 
response of the Group of Seven industrialized countries to the Russian 
crises was woefully inadequate, and the loss of control quite scary.3 
By not handling the recent financia! crises in a timely or effective 
manner, the G8 has demonstrated that, either. by choice or by inability, it is not 
an institution of effective global leadership in the areas of deepest importance. 
Important issues of fmancial bailouts and coordination of supervision and reg-
ulation must be resolved prior to the new millennium. 
Section 2 of this chapter examines the dramatic increase of capital 
flows to developing economies and the importance of financia} intermedi-
aries in channeling these funds. Section 3 outlines the various risks brought 
about by greater integration of capital and money markets. Section 4 pres-
ents views on government regulation of domestic financia! systems and con-
siders the capacity of existing international organizations to fulfill this role. 
Section 5 outlines the critica} responsibilities of the Group of Seven (G7) 
and G8 in light of 1997-98 financia! crises. Section 6 offers a conclusion . 
Evolution of Capital Markets 
During the Bretton Woods System, capital flows were relatively limited. 
Hence, most capital flows and foreign exchange transactions occurred to 
finance and facilitate transactions in the real sector. As a result, a typical intema-
tional payments crisis was a slowly developing payments imbalance driven 
by transactions in the real sector. Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF 
and the World Bank were relatively well equipped to deal with these types of 
cnses. 
Following the advent of a floating exchange rate system, most of 
the industrialized nations began to remove capital restrictions and deregulate 
their domestic monetary and financia} markets, beginning with the United 
States and Canada in the early 1980s. The daily volume of foreign 
exchange transactions mushroomed from approximately $15 billion in 
1973 to $1.4 trillion in 1998, a volume that is severa! times larger than the 
daily volume of transactions that occur in the real sector. In addition, cross-
border transactions of bonds and equities in the United Sates (U.S.) 
increased from 9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1980 to 164 
percent in 1995 (Daniels and VanHoose, 1999, p. 174). 
Supervising the International Financia! System 109 
Increased Capital Flows to Developing Economies 
Arguably more important has been the increased volume of capital tlows among 
nations. Indeed, the most striking feature ofthe 1990s, is the increased volume 
of capital tlows to the emerging countries. Figure 7.1 illustrates the rise in total 
net private capital flows for the emerging economies, distinguishing between net 
direct investment tlows and portfolio flows. As shown in the figure, net prívate 
capital flows to the emerging economies has risen a dramatic 415%. 
Figure 7.1 Net Private Capital Flows to Emerging Economies, 1990-96 
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As learned in the 1994-1995 Mexican financial crisis, it is important 
to recognize the proportion of net private capital tlows that are portfolio 
investments. Thís tlow of short term capital, often referred to as "hot 
money", can reverse direction quickly, leaving a nation's financial sector in 
an illiquid positíon. (See Chang and Velasco, 1998, for an excellent revíew 
of the Asían liquidity problem.) Figure 7.1 shows that for the emergíng 
natíons, the largest proportion of net prívate capital flows was net portfolío 
flows until the Mexican financíal críses occurred. 
Figure 7.1 also demonstrates that the proportion of net portfolio 
flows to total prívate capital flows díffers wídely across the varíous regíons. 
For the Middle East and Europe, net portfolio flows account for 42% oftotal 
prívate flows, while it is a mere 8o/o for the transitíonal economies. The fact 
that portfolio flows can reverse quickly is evident in the Western Hemisphere 
region, where net portfolio flows dropped by $68.3 million in 1995 alone, 
representing a 112% decline. Net direct foreign investment flows as a per-
cent oftotal net prívate flows range from 58% for the transitional economies 
to a scant 7o/o for the Middle East and Europe economies. 
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The Importance of Financia! Intermedia/ion 
It is important to recognize that the capital flows described above are the sav-
ings of one nation's residents being loaned to another nation's residents. 
Financia] intermediaries play an extremely important role as they channel 
these savings to borrowers and help finance domestic investment. The sol-
vency of a nation's intermediaries is critica] for the stable flow of capital and 
continued growth and prosperity. 
Unfortunately, history has shown that financia] systems and interme-
diaries are quite fragile. The IMF estimates that since 1980, 133 of the 181 
member nations have experienced banking problems considered to be signif-
icant (Lindgren, et al, 1996). According to available estimates, the cost of the 
1977 through 1985 crisis in Spain amounted to 17o/o of its output. In the 
Nordic countries, the costs of the banking crises that occurred in the late 
1980s and early 1990s amounted to 8% of Finland's output, 6% in Sweden 
and 4o/o in Norway. The cost of the savings and loan crisis in the United 
States totaled at least $200 billion, or 3o/o of U.S. output (Goldstein and 
Tumer, 1996). 
The banking crises in the developing nations have tended to be much 
more severe. It is believed that the costs of the 1980's banking crises in 
Argentina equaled one-half ofthe nation's GDP. The Mexican crisis amount-
ed toa loss of 12 to 15% of output. The costs ofthe 1997-98 crises will be 
considerable. The 1995 real estate collapse in Japan resulted in the nonper-
formance of more than $250 billion in bank loans. In South Korea more than 
10% of all bank loans were non-performing by 1998. For India and China 
the number of non-performing loans are estimated to be nearly 20% of out-
standing loans. 
As one might suspect, given the increase in international capital 
flows, over 354% from 1986-98 (Daniels and VanHoose, 1999), very few 
nations' capital investment projects are purely financed by domestic interme-
diaries. Even investment in the United States that is bank-financed increas-
ingly relies on foreign banks, as the largest U.S. corporations use, on aver-
age, the services of foreign banks more than domestic institutions. Given the 
heightened level of integration, a nation's system of intermediaries is now 
exposed to new sources of risk. 
New Sources ofRisk 
The growth and globalization of capital markets has brought about a vast 
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number of new opportunities for savers and borrowers. It has al so generated 
new risks. There are five particular sources of risk examined here; 'hot 
money' flows, systemic risk, contagian, increasing sophistication of financia] 
instruments, and regulatory arbitrage. 
Hot Money Flows 
As demonstrated in the previous section, there has been a dramatic increase 
in short-term portfolio flows, particularly to the emerging economies. Many 
of these emerging nations ha ve financia! and banking sectors that are under-
developed, not regulated, and not properly supervised. When positive, these 
net inflows can put upward pressure on a nation's currency and on domestic 
inflation. On the other hand, they also represent a lower cost form of financ-
ing (hence lower interest rates) and stimulate a nation's economy. 
Portfolio flows can, however, reverse direction at rates that quickly 
exhaust the cumulative buildup of years of inflows. In an economy with an 
underdeveloped financia! sector, these outflows may result in an illiquid 
banking system and put downward pressure on the nation's currency. Under 
a fixed exchange rate regime, the government is faced with opposing prob-
lems: The banking system needs additionalliquidity while the exchange rate 
regime requires higher interest rates. This is the type of problem seen in the 
1997-98 financia! crises (see Glick, 1998, for a survey ofthe literature in this 
area). 
Herstatt Risk 
A second aspect is Herstatt Risk or credit risk that spans borders and/or time 
zones. In 1974, German banking regulators closed the failed Herstatt bank at 
3:30p.m., after the bank had received European foreign exchange payments 
but befare it made required payments to U.S. banks. Because U.S. banks did 
not receive anticipated payments, they were, in many cases, unable to fulfill 
their own obligations. By the time the entire event unwound, U.S. banks had 
lost as much as $200 million dollars. 
Transmission of Shocks 
A third aspect of increased globalization is the transmission of shocks and the 
potential of contagian. As financia! markets become more integrated, the 
transmission of shocks becomes possible and can even be magnified. Such 
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was the case ofthe U.S. stock market crash ofthe 1980s. Because ofinter-
twined markets, the crash spilled into exchanges across the globe. The recent 
East Asian crises shows that currency crises may have the potential for 
regional contagian. Empírica] work by Glick and Rose (1998) indicates that 
currency crises affect "clusters" of nations through intemational trade chao-
neis. 
Increased Sophistication of Financia/ Instruments 
As the financial markets have evolved, new and highly sophisticated finan-
cia] instruments have been introduced. The use of these instruments often 
becomes widespread before appropriate domestic regulators and corporate 
managers fully understand their risks and benefits. The 1995 collapse of 
Barings bank illustrates this point. The same day that Peter Baring had to ask 
the Bank ofEngland to intervene, and the day after the trader involved in the 
derivatives fiasco, N ick Leeson, faxed in his resignation, Barings was to 
announce and award company bonuses, including a bonus to Leeson in the 
amount of E450,000. The totallosses to Barings is estimated to be E927 mi I-
lion. 
Regulatory Arbitrage 
A final aspect, one that has not received as much attention in the literature, is 
the impact of increased globalization, competition, and technological 
advances on bank structure. Regulatory arbitrage, establishing foreign 
offices to avoid domestic regulation, has increased dramatically due to tech-
nological advances in banking. Globalization and competition has led to 
increased merger activity and the creation of "mega" banks. Both activities 
undermine the attempts of sovereign govemments to regulate and supervisor 
national banking institutions. 
The various risks listed above heighten the importance of a sound 
payments system and a sound system of banks and financia] intermediaries. 
Financial solvency is, therefore, a key policymaking issue and critica] to the 
operation and stability of the global economy. 
The Regulation and Supervision of Financia( Systems 
How should sovereign governments and international organizations respond 
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to the risks of increasing financia} integration? It is important to first distin-
guish between international financia! liberalization and financia} regulation. 
Liberalization is the opening up of the financia! market to foreign partici-
pants, increasing competition and opportunities for domestic banks. 
Regulation is the governing of the financia! sector in order to improve its 
operation of financia} intermediation. Obviously, and as evident in the 1997-
98 financia] crises, appropriate regulation and supervision is required for the 
domestic financia) system to absorb and channel in an economically efficient 
way the inflows and outflows of capital. 
Views of Government Intervention 
One view of government intervention in the financia} sector is that finan-
cia} intermediation is inherently an unstable business whose fortunes rise 
and fall with the business cycle and that financia} markets may have inher-
ent imperfections. Hence, government regulation and safety nets are 
required to prevent periodic banking collapses. 
In line with this view, Von Hagen and Fratianni ( 1998) identify 
three main reasons for financia} regulation. The first is that small deposi-
tors find it too costly to continuously monitor the activities of intermedi-
aries. Hence, small depositors need protection from the risk of bank fail-
ure. The second is that regulation is required to prevent large withdrawals 
from one bank which might affect the entire industry, that is, to prevent 
contagian. The final reason is to preserve the integrity ofthe payments sys-
tem. The authors assert that these types of banking regulation involve the 
reallocation of risk and therefore wealth among market participants. In a 
global setting this reallocation can become quite complexas sovereign gov-
ernments wish to protect domestic residents over foreign residents. 
Another view is that regulation that eliminates competition and the 
existence of safety nets creates a moral hazard problem and may actually 
be responsible for recent banking crises. This second view has been used 
extensively to build a critica! case against the necessity of international 
organizations such as the IMF. lt has played particularly well on the floor 
ofthe U.S. Congress who delayed approval of a new allocation of funds to 
the IMF until October 1998. 
Regulation and Supervision: New or Old Institutions? 
In spite of recent criticism, there ha ve been a number of well placed initia-
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tives and actions taken in response to the risks described above. Examples 
are the Lamfalussy Report, a 1990 Group of Ten (G 1 O) initiative that out-
lined the legal responsibilities of any intermediary undertaking a large vol-
ume wire transfer, the Basle Capital Accord for capital adequacy standards, 
cross-border banking principies for consolidated supervision, risk manage-
ment guidelines for derivatives trading, and core principies for effective 
banking supervision. 
Many of these initiatives resulted from G 7 directives. The Halifax 
and Lyon summits, in particular, addressed the global financial situation. 
(See the excellent volume by Kenen, 1996, where most of the following 
information is taken from.) Directives to the IMF included a request to the 
IMF to develop procedures to provide faster access to IMF credit with 
strengthened conditionality, to develop standards for data availability, and 
to intensify surveillance beyond Article IV policy reviews. The response 
was an emergency financing mechanism, the Special Data Dissemination 
Standards, and publication of Article IV reviews for those countries wish-
ing the reviews to be public. 
The G 1 O was asked to double the credit facilities available to the 
IMF and to review procedures that might prevent or resolve financial 
crises. The G 1 O responded with a new arrangement that doubled available 
IMF credit and, as a first-step, conducted a survey of market participants 
and domestic regulations in numerous countries. Based on the results of 
the survey, the G 1 O emphasized market based governance and that ca un-
tries should not expect bailouts the "size of Mexico". 
Responsibility of the G7 and G8 
Through these recent directives, the leaders demonstrated a recognition of 
the comparative advantages ofthe supranational organizations and the abil-
ity to construct well placed directives. They were not, however, timely nor 
were all directives fulfilled. There are a number of pressing issues that the 
G7 and G8 must address. (See Sachs, 1998, for a proposed agenda and a 
recommendation that the G8 be expanded toa G 16.) 
1MF Bailouts 
Arguably most important is the problem of IMF bailouts. As is frequently 
argued, unlimited IMF bailouts increase the moral hazard of lending and 
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borrowing activities. Jeffrey Sachs (1998, p. 24) argues that the IMF 
worked "mightily and wrongheadedly" to make the world safe for "naive 
25-year-old investment bankers who do not know much about world poli-
tics". Bailouts such as that in East Asia should cease. 
Recent words of the G8 indicate that nations should not expect 
unlimited bailouts. lt appears, however, that the IMF is continuing to 
approach problems as it has in the past and, thus IMF actions say otherwise. 
lt is vital that the G7 /G8 formulate a coherent and consistent approach to 
bailouts of future financia! crises. The G7 /G8 and the IMF must break the 
expectations they helped create. lt is disappointing that the strongest state-
ment the leaders could offer at the Birmingham summit was that "it is also 
important to ensure that the private sector plays a timely and appropriate 
role in crises resolution".4 
IMF Responsibility 
The G7 should shoulder the responsibility of actions being taken by the 
IMF. In contrast to organizations such as the United Nations, voting shares 
at the IMF are based on a weighted average as opposed toa "one nation, 
one vote" scheme. The weighted average voting power of the G7 in creas-
es for many important areas. On most issues, the G7 has 4 7% power and 
on the most important issues the G7's voting share is 70-80%. Hence, the 
G7 can define the broad agenda and block initiatives. In a 1998 testimony 
before the U.S. Congressional Joint Economic Committee, Paul Volcker 
(Wall Street Journal, 7 May 1998) stated that Congress "should pay Iess 
attention to the faceless bureaucrats at the IMF and focus more on where 
IMF policy on rescue packages really gets made. Your concerns should be 
addressed to Treasury". 
IMF/World Bank Capabilities 
In the longer-run, the G8 should rethink completely the role and even the 
necessity of the IMF and the World Bank. The G8 must first realize that 
the IMF is not technically equipped to deal with the types of financial crises 
that occur in the post-Bretton Woods era. Due to the increased integration 
of capital markets, the current crises ha ve been fast-developing, financia) in 
nature, and beyond the capacity of the Fund and other existing internation-
al organizations. As an example, the most current IMF Manual For 
Country Economists states: 
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A country will require IMF assistance when it is having balance of pay-
ments difficulties or, in other words, when the normal inflow of externa) 
savings is not sufficient to finance its resource gap, which is defined as 
the difference between domestic savings and domestic investment. 
Next the G8 must realize that the current approach to Fund conditionality is 
counterproductive. Sachs (1998, p. 25), states that: 
This process (conditionality) is out of hand. lt has undermined political 
legitimacy in dozens of developing countries, especially since the IMF is 
often happy to conspire with governments to make end runs around par-
liaments in the interests of "reform". The contents of IMF programmes 
are too flawed to be a standard of good or poor performance. Markets 
realize this, so IMF programmes do less and less to rally them. 
Supervisory Coordination 
Finally, the G8 must further discussions on supervisory coordination. 
Primarily an initiative of Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martín, the issue 
should be expanded to include regulatory coordination in order to reduce reg-
ulatory arbitrage. In contrast to the Martín initiative, however, this should not 
lead to a new supranational body composed of governmental agents. It 
should be delegated to an agency with the greatest comparative advantage, 
perhaps the London Club or the Bank for Intemational Settlements (BIS). It 
should also seek input from prívate sector practitioners as in today's financial 
environment, operational risk is greater the market risk. Bank management 
must therefore be involved. 
Conclusion 
It has been argued here that the G7, G8, and the summit process has failed to 
deal effectively with the most pressing economic issue ofthe day, that is, fast-
developing liquidity crises of domestic financia} sectors. The G 7 and the G8 
leaders have deferred these problems primarily to the IMF which has not the 
resources nor the technical ability to deal with such crises. Key agenda items 
should in elude the size and availability of bailout funds and the coordination 
of financia} supervision and regulation. This is not an agenda for the new 
millennium. It is an agenda for today. At the turn of the millennium it may 
be much too late to address these issues. 
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Notes 
1 According to one insider of the annual summits, the Japanese contingent 
brought up the impending financial problems in Thailand at the 1997 
Denver summit. The other parties were uninterested and consequently the 
topic was dropped from discussions. 
2 Soros, G. ( 15 September 1998), "The Crises of Global Capitalism", The 
Wa/1 Street Journal, p. A22. 
3 Soros, G. (15 September 1998), "The Crises of Global Capitalism", The 
Wa/1 Street Journal, p. A22. 
4 G8 Birmingham Summit Communiqué, 15-17 May 1998. 
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